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CASE COMMENTS

point. The Rules do not alter or change substantive law. See Rule
17(c) relative to guardians ad litem.
A final point of interest in this area was noted in Glade Mining
Co. v. Harris,supra. There the court, in deciding a question of first
impression for West Virginia, held that where a record shows error
as to a minor defendant, the judgment will be reversed, even though
there was no appeal on the part of the minor. This is demanded of
the court, it being the duty of the court, as the guardian of infants,
to protect their rights.
Ralph CharlesDusic, Jr.

Insurance-Waiver and Estoppel as Satisfying Condition of
Proof of Loss in Fire Insurance Policies
Ps, husband and wife, brought an action to recover against Ds,
two fire insurance companies, upon one policy insuring Ps' dwelling
and another policy insuring their household property. Both policies
required, as a condition precedent to recovery, a proof of loss,
signed and sworn to by the insured. The trial court entered judgment for Ps. Held, affirmed as to the dwelling insurance as Ps
"substantially" complied with the proof of loss requirement by submitting to an examination under oath by the insurer's counsel. Reversed in the case of the household property policy. The court found
as a matter of law that a list of household property lost in the fire,
improperly valued at cost, and mailed to the adjuster was not a
"proof of loss" notwithstanding: (1) Ps were "ignorant and illiterate"; (2) Ps lost their policies in the fire which policies were replaced by the solicitor with memoranda showing issuance of the
policies but not mentioning the conditions precedent to D's recovery;
(3) Ps were not apprised of the requirement to submit proofs of loss
-on the contrary, both the solicitor and the adjuster alledgedly told
Ps that it would not be necessary to file any papers other than the
list of household property and the values thereof which should be,
and was, mailed in an envelope provided by the adjuster. Nor were
the words and acts of D's agents sufficient to bind D by waiver and
estoppel as D's agents did not have such authority. Maynard v.
National Fire Ins. Co., 129 S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1963).
The result of the finding in the personal property policy case
appears to be harsh. The court refused the jury finding that the
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insurer had waived the defects of the "proof of loss" mailed to the
adjuster. The court registered its sympathy with the hapless Ps,
quoting from Wade v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n., 115
W. Va. 694, 177 S.E. 611 (1934): "An insured is entitled to the protection which he buys and for which he pays."
The court's ruling is not so harsh, however, when it is noted that
West Virginia has held that a "failure to furnish such proof of loss
within the given time does not wholly destroy all right of recovery
but only delays right of action..." where a fire insurance policy requires a proof of loss within a given time, and where the policy
provides for its forfeiture for certain causes, but not for failure to
furnish such proof of loss. Munson v. German Ins. Co., 55 W. Va.
423, 47 S.E. 160 (1904). The Munson case seems to be applicable to
the facts of the instant case. The fire was on October 11, 1959, six
months later this action was instituted. Had PsZ counsel filed the
requisite proofs of loss with Ds at that time, he could have brought
his action sixty days thereafter without having to rely upon
proving a waiver and estoppel.
It is suggested that a situation of waiver and estoppel was
available as a result of the alleged words and acts of the adjuster in
the household property insurance cause. Syllabus point 2 of
Lusk v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 80 W. Va. 39, 91 S.E. 1078 (1917),
makes clear the distinction between conditions which may be waived
in the teeth of a "non-waiver" clause: A clause in a fire insurance
policy "... forbidding waiver by an agent of 'any provision or condition"' except by written endorsement, relates to provisions and
conditions which are essential to the validity of the contract and its
continuance in force, and "does not refer to stipulations to be performed after a loss has occurred." (Emphasis added.) See, 17
AppLrEr_,
INsuRANCE LAW AND PcrncE 593 (1945). This, the
court found, is the "great weight of authority." Lusk v. American
Cent. Ins. Co., supra at 45. The case of Fitzsimmons v. Alliance Fire
Ins. Co., 115 W. Va. 303, 175 S.E. 62 (1934), follows and, perhaps, is
analogous to the Lusk case. The court in the Fitzsimmons case held
that if the conduct of the insurer, acting through its local agents and
an alleged "special agent and adjuster," was such that would "reasonably induce the insured to believe that no formal proof would be
required, 'such conduct will operate to excuse non-compliance."'
That the degree of "reasonable inducement" might vary from the
instant case is immaterial at this point, as that is fact for the jury.
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Slater v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., 68 W. Va. 779, 71
S.E. 197 (1910), preceded the Lusk case. In a petition for rehearing
the Slater case, the court refused the contention that the non-waiver
clause was inapplicable after the loss occured. In the instant case,
the Slater case is cited for the proposition that an adjuster ".
has no authority or power, as such, to waive proof of loss, required
by the policy...." But the syllabus goes on to say: ".... when the
policy contains the clause, limiting the authority of agents, found
in the standard insurance policy." It is contended that the more
recent Lusk case renders ineffective the Slater case in so far as the
two are inconsistent. The Slater case cited as its sole primary
authority Morris v. Dutchess Ins. Co., 67 W. Va. 368, 68 S.E. 22
(1910), which held that denial of liability is in legal effect a waiver
of preliminary proofs of loss only where the agent or adjuster had
express or implied authority to make the denial. The authority of
the Morris case is substantially impaired, it is suggested, by the
ignominious position of the Slater case in Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 186
(1956). The weight of authority has held that a non-waiver provision "... is inapplicable to stipulations to be performed after a
loss has occurred, such as that requiring proofs of loss to be furnished." Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 186 (1956). The Slater case is the
only case cited contra to the weight in the annotation. A 1918
Georgia decision provides the sole dissent to Annot., 22 A.L.R. 424
(1923) to which the later annotation is a supplement. The adjuster's
requisite "authority" to waive proof by denial was put to a lenient
test in Rucker v. Fire Ass'n, 120 W. Va. 63, 67, 196 S.E. 494 (1938).
The court held that an adjuster was clothed with such authority,
and a letter from the insurer stating that the claim had been referred to the adjuster was conclusive evidence of this authority.
In the instant case it would appear that the court has changed its
position on the applicability of non-waiver clauses to stipulations
to be performed after the loss has occurred. As this change is not
supported by authority, it would behoove counsel to move with
utmost care in this area of waiver and estoppel and to avoid reliance
thereon where possible.
Stephen Grant Young
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